WAR

"*On July 7th, 1950 we were shipped by Land/Sea Transport (LST) to the port of Pusan Korea, arriving there about July 15th. From there I was assigned to headquarters (HQ) 25th Infantry Division which was located in Sangju, Korea. My duties there were with liaison and reconnaissance platoons. I worked with G-2 Combat Tactics and Intelligence (CTI), The Dept. of Secret Operations (DSO) and the 5th Rangers Regimental Combat Team (RTC); unattached but in support of any element that needed our expertise. Under my charge were two platoons (80 men) of the best trained and motivated professional soldiers in the 8th Army Far Eastern Command (FECOM); commanded by General MacArthur."*

"After arrival at 25th HQ, General Walton H. Walker (whom I knew before the war) briefed me personally. He used to come once a week to Camp Chitose to check and inspect the battalion buildings, troops, HQ and officers. I was his chauffeur and personal bodyguard for one week. After 1700 hours (5 pm) I would drive him to the officer's club for his one quart of Jack Daniel Black Label. In about 1 ½ hours two of the waiters would drag him out and put him in the jeep."

"When we got to his quarters the Officer of the Day (OD), along with myself, would put him to bed. Reminded me of home with dad. 'Isn't this a bitch.' I would say to myself. Then I had my post outside his bedroom door. By 0500 (5 am) that one quart was empty because I had to throw it out in the morning."

"(Before the end of July 1950) our key mission involved liaison flights over enemy positions, to calculate approx. enemy battle lines. My two platoons and I were committed to retrieving information on size of troop concentrations, types of vehicles, war weaponry, munitions, fixed wing aircraft and field communications that were being used by enemy forces. This was to be done by actual ground count of the above objectives."

*"This information was very critical as to the type of equipment and armed forces that would be needed by United Nations Forces (UNF), to defend the Port of Pusan (known as the Pusan Perimeter). (The evening before starting our mission) we were reminded by DSO that under the rules of Land Warfare a prisoner of war is required to give **only** his name, rank and serial number. There is CIA information that American prisoners of war have given more information than required to the enemy."*

"At 0300 the following morning we were briefed as to where certain elements of the 27th Infantry Regiment (IR) were, in the southern sector. Heavy casualties were being inflicted by large enemy forces – size undetermined. In the center of the Division Zone (DZ) is the 24th (IR). On the north is the Republic of Korea (ROK) II Corps, and the 25th Inf. Div. We were also told that all UN and American fighting forces were having very heavy enemy infiltrations from artillery and mortar fire."

"At 0415 that morning my two platoons and I began our missions to retrieve what information we could within 72 hours and report (those findings) to G-2. As follows:"

Operation of Enemy Component Elements in Vicinity of 27th Infantry Regiment:

Infantry: Est. 1200 enemy troops in vicinity of 1065-1420 (grid coordinates)

Est. 1 Battalion (Bn) vicinity of 1106-1520. Est. 1 Bn. vicinity of 1105-1517, moving east.

a) *Many enemy T-34 type tanks in area of 27th. Number as yet unknown.*

b) *Air: Enemy is using L-5 type liaison aircraft.*

c) Artillery: Heavy enemy artillery fire being received in vicinity of 1106-1520. Battery size unknown.

d) Enemy combat efficiency: Appears to be very good.

e) Enemy moral: Insufficient food and hardships of war seem to have no adverse effect upon the fanatical attitude of the enemy.

f) Admin. Support: By coded contact with ROK liaison they believe that North Korean (NK) troops are using civilians to carry ammunition from the north, going and coming through the mountains particularly at night.

g) Heavy enemy troops are infiltrating into U.S. areas long before action. These troops remain in houses using civilians as shields and remain unseen until ordered to join in engagement with U.S. troops.

Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Weapons:

1) Armored Units:

The North Korean Tank Regiment appears to be of strength equivalent to the U.S. Tank Battalion. Tanks normally precede the Infantry by 15 to 45 minutes in the attack, press through our forward positions to the rear (enemy line) searching out heavy close support weapons and tanks.

Infantry in this case used rifles and automatic weapons. North Korean tanks move generally along secondary roads and trails to evade aerial observation and attacks. Small enemy group infiltrations during darkness, rally for an attack in coordination with frontal attack by tanks and infantry. Tanks are thatched with straw roofing and haystacks as effective camouflage.

2) Infantry:

Their division tactics include a frontal attack with strong flanking movement supported by artillery and tanks. The unit attacking frontally is widely dispersed and keeps up heavy fire, while strong flanking elements constitute the main effort. We also noted that enemy infantry infiltrates our lines disguised as refugees in white clothing carrying unassembled firearms and uniforms in bundles. We have observed and sadly experienced their use of civilians, in particular children forced to become suicide bombers, when mines were strapped to their bodies.

Ammunition and supplies are generally transported by carts or human waste buckets (honey buckets) both day and night. Infantry sometimes move toward our lines along the tops of mountain ridges disguised as farmers whose dress is predominately white. Women and children usually accompany these groups. When the enemy reaches a point adjacent to and behind friendly lines, they assemble weapons that were hidden in baggage carried by these women and children. Upon a given signal, fire is directed from ridges upon friendly flanks and rear, forcing friendly forces to retire. Further to the rear the withdrawing forces are cleverly ambushed.

Weapons normally carried by disguised infiltrating elements are rifles, .30 caliber machine guns, mortars and grenades. Logs or barbed wire roadblocks are not normally used, but concentrated and increased fire is utilized to shoot up personnel and cripple equipment attempting to retreat through their only avenue of escape. (From) our close observation we noticed that the enemy are good strategists; sufficient enough to determine very accurately what the withdrawal route will be; (preparing) his automatic and heavy weapons for the kill. At the same time the main body is moving forward to mop up behind our lines (where) our heavy equipment must go to retreat.

Camouflage techniques on the part of the North Korean Infantryman is far superior to ours, when in close contact with patrols and security outposts. The fact that the enemy is camouflage conscious and taking advantage of all possible tricks, is borne out by my own personal observations; coupled with other UN Liaison and Recon. Aircraft; having stated on occasion that "No enemy observed in certain sections."

The enemy will camouflage his vehicles in villages and towns to look exactly like Korean huts or houses. In one instance we noticed that pontoon bridges were used for foot traffic at night and removed during daylight hours. Whistles control enemy night patrols. In two positive instances upon our position, it was indicated by the firing of a white flare, which meant a flanking attack by enemy forces was eminent.

This summary of intelligence accumulated by the two platoons over 72 hours; including the observed weapons and armaments to follow; very probably became the justification for US troops to attack and destroy civilian populations. (Google - "No Gun Ri Massacre" 26-29 July 1950 and "Sinchon Massacre" 17 Oct – 7 Dec 1950)

3) Enemy Weapons

1) – Tanks: (T-34-85 Russian built, 5 man crew, 35 tons, speed 34 mph, range 150 miles, armament – 85mm gun and two 7.62 caliber machine guns)

2) - Armored Car: small (BA 64), 5 man crew, 2.6 tons, speed 50 mph, range 375 miles, armament - One 7.62 Machine Gun)

3) – Self Propelled Assault Gun: (SU-76) Weight 10 tons, 76mm gun. Sides lightly armored that can be penetrated with .50 caliber armor piercing (AP), belly can be ruptured with high explosives (HE) mines. Frontal plate can be penetrated with bazooka ammunition.

4) – Artillery: a) 122 mm Field Gun. Muzzle velocity 2625 feet per second (FPS) max. range is 22,750 yds. Projectile weight is 55.1 lbs. b) 76 mm Field Gun (M1927) Muzzle velocity 1247 FPS, max. range is 9400 yds. Projectile weight is 13.6 lbs. Rate of fire is 12 rounds per minute.

5) – Anti-tank Guns: (M1937) 45mm. Muzzle velocity is 2500 FPS that can penetrate 6.1 inch armor at 500 yards. Rate of fire 25 rounds per minute, projectile weight 3.1 lbs.

6) – Machine Guns: a) 7.62 mm heavy machine gun, belt fed. Weight 145 lbs. Practical rate of fire is 250-300 RPM. Effective range against aircraft is 1650 yds. b) – 12.7mm (M1938) machine gun, belt fed. A dual purpose gun, weight 379 lbs. with mount and shield. Practical rate of fire is 125 RPM, effective range is 1650 yds. against aircraft.

7) – Sub-Machine Gun: 7.62mm (M1941) Sub-Machine Gun, drum and box fed, automatic recoil with gas assist. Cyclic rate of fire 1000 RPM. Drum capacity is 71 rounds, box capacity is 35 rounds. Max. effective range is 330 yards, weight is 10.1 lbs.

8) – Rifles and Anti-Tank Rifles: a) 7.62mm (30-06 caliber) M1891/30 Rifle. Manually operated, 5 round clip. Barrel is 6" longer than the American M1, very crudely made but serviceable. Muzzle velocity is 2838 FPS, effective range is 440 yards. Weight 9.9 lbs. b) 14.5mm PTRDAT Rifle. 5 round clips, muzzle velocity 3350 FPS, effective range of fire against armor is 550 yds. Max. range against fixed ground targets is 880 yds. Will penetrate 4.2" armor at 110 yds.

9) – Mortars: a) 82mm (M1936) Max. range 3499 yds. weight 136 lbs. Rate of fire 15 – 20 RPM, weight per shell 7.4 lbs. b) 120mm (M1938) Max. range 6236 yds. Mounted on 2-wheel transport limber with solid rubber tires. Weight each unit 606 lbs. Projectile weight 35.5 lbs. Can drop or trigger fire.

End of Report

"Today is July 21, 1950, time 0300. We are all very tired, hungry and damn sick of WW I and II "K" rations. Around here there is a saying, 'if the K's don't kill ya, the NK's (North Koreans) will.' We are hoping that we will get a hot meal, after some shuteye. We are back at headquarters (where) my boys are bedding down wherever. I still have to prepare our findings and make my reports. (see above) (Also) turn in dog tags of the 4 men of the 1st platoon and 2 from the 2nd platoon KIA while we were data gathering. Then write letters to their loved ones. It's a real bitch."

"Major Tarkenton just advised me that the "rubber is on", (meaning bouncing powdered eggs), the time is 0500. Got a letter from home; same old bullshit; dad is in jail, mom needs $500 to bail him out. Where am I going to get that kind of money? They already are getting all but $10 (from me). I still owe finance $350 since May for the same thing."

"Well, it's my turn now to get some much needed shut eye."